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Abstract 
This paper exploits a natural experiment to study the influence of regional fac-
tors on initial and subsequent location choices among immigrants. The results 
suggest that immigrants to Sweden are attracted to regions with high represen-
tation from the individual’s birth country and large overall immigrant popula-
tions. Labor market opportunities affect location decisions, but people also tend 
to choose localities with many welfare recipients. The impact of most regional 
factors does not change over time. Thus, there is little evidence that informa-
tion improves or that preferences differ between initial and subsequent stages. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, the immigrant population has increased in Sweden as 
well as in many other western countries. Combined with a declining perform-
ance of new immigrants in the labor market, this has raised public interest in a 
number of issues concerning immigrants and immigration policies. These in-
clude the residential location of immigrants and the pattern of so-called secon-
dary migration, i.e., relocations within the host country. 
The empirical literature on immigrants’ residential patterns has so far been 
limited in scope. The lack of longitudinal data where individuals’ behavior can 
be tracked over time has led researchers to focus on initial location choices, or 
location patterns at one particular point in time. The typical study has not been 
able to identify both the initial and subsequent location of an individual.
1 
Methodological difficulties associated with studying subsequent choices has 
probably also contributed. 
This investigation gains further knowledge on these issues by several 
means. First, it uses longitudinal Swedish micro data where individuals can be 
followed from the time of immigration. Second, it exploits a unique natural ex-
periment to handle methodological problems. Third, it studies the impact of an 
unusually rich set of local characteristics. 
I ask three main questions. First, which regional factors affect people’s de-
cisions on where to stay? Second, does the importance of these factors change 
over time, i.e., do initial and secondary choices differ? These choices may dif-
fer both as a result of changed preferences, but also because the initial choice is 
made under imperfect information. The third question is whether the effects of 
these regional factors vary between various immigrant groups and natives? 
The results of the study give information on which regions that can expect 
high levels of immigration, and which regions that are likely to have large im-
migrant populations in the long run. These are important questions from a pol-
icy perspective, and can be central for, e.g., the need for public services in dif-
ferent locations. Furthermore, many Western countries have taken steps to di-
rect immigrants into certain regions (see e.g. Dutch Refugee Council 1999). 
                                                      
1 Bartel’s (1989) influential study uses a panel to study internal migration; however, it does not 
necessarily contain the initial location in the US. This is the case also for Beenstock (1999), who 
studies internal migration of immigrants to Israel. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants   4
Such policies are more likely to succeed if they take individual preferences into 
account. 
The quasi-experimental character of the data stems from a governmental 
refugee settlement policy pursued in the late 1980s. Under this regime, indi-
viduals were not free to choose where to reside initially, but were assigned to a 
municipality by the government. This placement appears to have created a geo-
graphic distribution that was independent of unobserved individual characteris-
tics, which gives two advantages in the empirical analysis. One is that I can 
study the decision to relocate out of the initial location to get information on 
the factors that attract and repel immigrants. Another advantage is that, under 
certain conditions, investigating the destination choices of those who relocate 
will not give biased results due to the selection of movers. To study how initial 
choices are made, I use a group of comparable immigrants arriving before the 
policy was implemented. 
A common international experience is that immigrants are more concen-
trated to large cities than the native population. In 1997, 53 percent of the 
Swedish immigrant population lived in one of the country’s three largest cities; 
for natives this figure was 35 percent. Similarly, in 1990, California, New 
York, Florida, and Texas hosted 63 percent of the foreign-born US population 
(Zavodny 1997), but only 31 percent of the overall population.  
Summing up the US literature, Zavodny (1999) concludes that the most im-
portant factor determining the locational choices of new immigrants is the 
presence of earlier ones. Different studies come to different conclusions on 
whether labor market conditions (such as average wages and unemployment) 
affect where immigrants live. However, recent evidence, e.g. Borjas (1999a) 
and Jaeger (2000), more frequently indicate that labor market prospects do mat-
ter. Another hypothesis, presented in Borjas (1999b), is that the generosity of 
the local welfare system may affect the location choice. He supports this with 
evidence that immigrants are clustered in states with generous welfare systems, 
and argues that these states may work as “welfare magnets”. Dodson (2001) 
finds that welfare generosity has an effect on immigrant inflow and that this ef-
fect is present for all admission categories. By contrast, Zavodny (1997) claims 
that the design of the welfare system shows no correlation with state immigra-
tion when the presence of earlier immigrants is controlled for. The US experi-
ence also shows that secondary migration goes in the direction of regions with 
already large immigrant populations (Belanger and Rogers, 1992). Neverthe-
less, Bartel (1989) finds that some groups, such as the highly educated, tend to IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants  5
move to less ethnically concentrated areas compared to where they resided ini-
tially. Funkhouser (2000) finds that moves out of ethnically concentrated areas 
occur after many years in the host country. 
The main results from this investigation are that substantial representation 
from the individual’s birth country is an important factor both for decisions to 
relocate and location choice. People are also drawn to places with large overall 
immigrant populations; this factor seems to be even more important for subse-
quent choices. Local unemployment and other indicators on labor market pros-
pects have an impact on the decisions. Most regional factors appear to affect 
initial and subsequent choices in similar ways—changes in preferences or 
available information do not seem to be major issues. There are, though, 
indications that refugee immigrants learn about local public services and 
consider this factor in secondary location decisions. There are also clear 
differences across groups in how the choices are made. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section two provides some de-
tail about the implementation of the placement policy. Section three contains 
the empirical investigation. After a description of the data, I discuss how the 
placement policy can be used to solve methodological problems. The place-
ment policy is then exploited in an analysis of the factors affecting the decision 
to relocate away from the initial place of residence. Finally, I study initial and 
subsequent location choices among refugee immigrants and make comparisons 
with other immigrants and natives. Concluding remarks follow in section 4. 
 
 
2 The  placement  policy 
Before 1985 a majority of refugee immigrants to Sweden were already in the 
country when they applied for asylum.
2 The usual procedure was for asylum 
seekers to remain in the municipality where they had applied, awaiting authori-
ties’ decisions.  Thus, it was the task of the municipalities to assist the immi-
grants in finding a place to stay, and many immigrants stayed on in the first lo-
cation after receiving a residence permit. Most applications for asylum were 
submitted in municipalities with large populations of previous immigrants, and 
                                                      
2 Refugee centers were in place for quota refugees. The annual inflow of this group of immi-
grants was roughly constant during the 1980s; thus, its share of total immigration decreased as 
refugee immigration soared. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants   6
refugee immigration increased the concentration of the immigrant population to 
certain areas. 
Partly because of complaints from municipalities taking a disproportionately 
large share of immigration, a new system was implemented in the beginning of 
1985.
3 The idea was to distribute refugee immigrants over a larger number of 
municipalities, in order to get a more even distribution of the immigrant popu-
lation and to facilitate integration. Smaller communities would in turn aid inte-
gration by making interaction between immigrants and natives possible. Ini-
tially, the aim was to arrange for reception in about 60 municipalities. How-
ever, because of rapidly increasing immigration, a much larger number became 
involved: in 1989, 277 of Sweden’s 284 municipalities had an agreement with 
the Immigration Board to provide spots. The factors that initially were sup-
posed to govern the placement—labor market and education opportunities—
were to a large extent neglected in favor of housing availability. 
Edin et al. (2000) describe in more detail how the system developed, and 
how it worked for people immigrating under it.
4 They reach three conclusions 
that are of importance for the design of this study. First, a vast majority of the 
refugee immigrants were included in the governmental placement program. 
Second, the placement policy was strictest between 1987 and 1989. During this 
period about 90 percent of the refugee immigrants were assigned to municipali-
ties. Third, the policy was implemented in a way that can be interpreted as a 
natural experiment. The assignment of municipality appears to have been inde-
pendent of unobserved individual characteristics, with little scope for most 
people to affect their initial location. Note, though, that after initial placement 
there were no restrictions on people’s right to relocate. Leaving the assigned 
municipality only meant the loss of some activities granted in an introduction 
program, which lasted about 18 months. 
Several Swedish studies document various aspects of the “Whole of Sweden 
strategy” (Andersson 1993, 1996, 1998; Borgegård et al. 1998; The Committee 
on Immigration Policy 1996; The Immigration Board 1997, 1998). A general 
conclusion is that the implementation of the policy increased the dispersion of 
immigrants in Sweden. Åslund (2000) concludes that, despite common percep-
                                                      
3 In practice, the new system came into effect during a trial period in the fall of 1984. 
4 Their description is partly based on interviews with officials of the Immigration Board. For an 
extensive description of the policy, and a survey of research related to it, see The Immigration 
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tions, there is only weak evidence on a boost in secondary migration stemming 
from the policy shift. The raw numbers of Table 1 support this claim. They in-
dicate that secondary migration was high among those subjected to the policy, 
but it was almost as common among refugee immigrants who arrived prior to 
the policy. The table also suggests that recently arrived immigrants in general 
move more than natives. This is in line with the common finding that people 
who have moved once are likely to move again. 
 
Table 1. Relocation within four years, percent. 
  Refugee immigrants Natives OECD immigrants 
Program 87/89  37.6 13.0 26.4 
  
Pre-program 81/83  35.6 11.9 30.1 
  
Difference 87/89–81/83  2.0 1.1 –3.7 
Notes: Fraction relocating out of the initial municipality within four years after arrival. Relo-
cation is defined as living in a different municipality four years after the initial observation. 
See section 3.1 for a description of the groups. “Natives” consist of random samples drawn in 
the 87/89 and 81/83 periods. The 81/83 cohorts of refugee immigrants have been re-weighted 
to conform to the region-of-origin distribution of the 87/89 cohorts. 
 
Most refugee immigrants arriving before 1985 were free to choose their ini-
tial location. Those arriving under the program faced severe restrictions on 
their possibilities to choose for themselves, and were normally placed by Swed-
ish authorities. In the next section, I exploit the differences between these re-
gimes in the empirical investigation. 
 
 
3 Empirical  analysis 
This section starts with a description of the sampling procedure and the data 
used in the study. I then outline the empirical strategy, and discuss the advan-
tages of exploiting data from the placement policy and the conditions under 
which these advantages are present. This is followed by an examination of how 
individual and municipal factors affect the decision to leave the initial place of 
residence and what characterizes people’s choices of destination, initially and 
in later stages. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants   8
3.1 Individual  data 
The main data source for this study is the longitudinal database LINDA, which 
is described in Edin and Fredriksson (2000). The database contains two repre-
sentative samples of parts of the Swedish population: a population sample cov-
ering about 3 percent of the total Swedish population, and an immigrant sample 
with approximately 20 percent of the foreign-born population. This study uses 
data from both samples. The database consists of a combination of income tax 
registers, censuses and the Swedish population register. Data are available for 
all household members of people included in the samples, and the members of 
a household can be linked to each other.
5 
I use data for the immigrant cohorts of three years before the new policy 
was implemented (1981–1983), and for three years when the program was run-
ning (1987–1989). The reason for choosing the latter period is that, as dis-
cussed earlier, the proportion of immigrants actively placed in municipalities 
by authorities was at its highest during these years. 1984 is excluded from the 
first group because the program in practice started out during the fall of that 
year. I also use a random sample of natives (Swedish-born) from LINDA for 
each of the included years.  
The registers contain no information on admission status for immigrants, 
i.e., whether the individual entered Sweden as a refugee is not known. To han-
dle this I adopt the following procedure. As a proxy for refugee status, only 
immigrants from countries that were not members of the OECD in 1985 (with 
some additions and exclusions described in the appendix) are included in the 
primary sample. Refugee immigrants with a grown-up Swedish-born person or 
a previous immigrant in the household in their first year in Sweden are ex-
cluded from the sample. This is to exclude those who were tied to people al-
ready living in Sweden, and therefore would not be included in the Immigra-
tion Board’s placement program. I include in the estimations individuals aged 
18–55 at the time of arrival (sample year for natives). 
The properties of the sample are shown in Table A1 in the appendix. The 
idea is to use the 81/83 cohorts for studying initial choices, and the program 
participants in the 87/89 cohorts for investigating secondary mobility and loca-
tion choice. To be able to compare these groups, I require them to be similar in 
observed and unobserved characteristics. The maintained assumption is that 
                                                      
5 The household definition available is the one used in the tax registers. This definition of a 
household identifies cohabiting couples without common children as separate households. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants  9
equality in observed characteristics means equality in unobserved ones. The 
fraction of female immigrants is slightly higher in the pre-program cohort, 
whereas the average age at immigration is about 30 in both cohorts. The frac-
tion of people married is somewhat higher in the program cohort, and the mar-
ried constitute a larger proportion among females than males in both groups. 
Regarding education eight years after arrival,
6 the two groups are a bit un-
evenly distributed over education categories. However, if we translate the fig-
ures into years of schooling, the difference in means between 87/89 and 81/83 
is only 0.2 years. None of these differences cause great concern for the analy-
sis. 
What is potentially more troubling is the difference in region of origin. In 
the 81/83 cohorts, immigration from Eastern Europe makes up 37 percent of 
the inflow; in 87/89 this figure is 17 percent. The most marked increase over 
time comes from the Middle East, going from 23 to 46 percent of the total im-
migration.
7 I will therefore re-weight the 81/83 data so that they conform to the 
region-of-origin distribution of the 87/89 cohorts.
8 
 
3.2  Factors affecting location decisions—regional data 
Regional characteristics have been collected from a large number of sources; 
see the appendix for a further description. Table 2 shows the municipal vari-
ables included in this investigation. The data are measured on an annual basis 
at the time of the individual’s arrival.
9 A central finding in previous research on 
immigrant location is that people choose to live where there are others with the 
same ethnic background and a presence of other immigrant groups. Large cities 
are also attractive. Living close to people with the same ethnic and linguistic 
background may of course be valuable as such, but can also be a way of estab-
lishing oneself in the new country. A high share of immigrants could reflect 
that the community has experience in dealing with issues related to new immi-
                                                      
6 Measures of education are not available before 1990. For the 1981 cohort, I use the 1990 census 
information on education. 
7 Most of the immigration from Eastern Europe to Sweden in the early 1980s came from Poland; 
in the later years of that decade, the war between Iran and Iraq generated large immigration flows 
from the Middle East. 
8 The weight given to each observation in any region-of-origin group X equals: (fraction of 87/89 
sample from X)/(fraction of 81/83 sample from X). 
9 Some variables are not available in all years. See the appendix for a closer description of the 
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grants, and/or an acceptance of foreign-born people leading to less risk of dis-
crimination and alienation. I use three variables to study these factors: (i) the 
fraction of the municipal population made up by people from the individual’s 
own birth country; (ii) the fraction of the population constituted by immigrants 
from other countries; (iii) the (log of the) size of the municipal population. 
Another issue that has received much attention is the importance of labor 
market characteristics. This study uses the local unemployment rate and the av-
erage earnings among earners in the municipality as measures of general condi-
tions in the labor market. To capture variations specific to immigrants, I use the 
fraction of working-age immigrants in the municipality that has a registered la-
bor income. 
The prevalence of social assistance recipients is a measure of the municipal-
ity’s socioeconomic status. One could also argue that welfare-prone individuals 
could use it as an indicator of the availability of social assistance. The take-up 
rate for social assistance—the fraction of the population earning less than a cer-
tain amount that receives social assistance—is a more direct measure of the lo-
cal welfare system’s generosity.
10 People may also base location decisions on 
other aspects of the characteristics of the local public sector (see e.g. Dahlberg 
and Fredriksson 2001). The local tax rate and the size of per capita municipal 
spending are used to indicate such behavior. I also include a measure of the 
properties of the local housing market: the fraction of residents in the munici-
pality who live in a dwelling over which they have some type of ownership.
11 
                                                      
10 I have also used an alternative measure of the welfare generosity. The issue is further dis-
cussed in the empirical analysis. 
11 In principle, this equals one minus the rental rate. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants  11
 
Table 2. Municipal variables, means, (std. dev.). 
Variable 1981/83 1987/89 
Ethnic concentration, (et/pop)*10
3 1.29 1.20 
(1.51) (1.51) 
Immigrant density, (im/pop) (%) 3.45 3.76 
(3.19) (2.93) 
Municipal population 29,848 30,401 
(51,762) (53,201) 
Municipal unemployment (%) 3.71 1.66 
(1.74) (1.05) 
ln (mean earnings) 11.08 11.60 
(0.10) (0.09) 
Immigrant employment (%) 87.06 82.74 
(7.91) (5.75) 
SA takers (%) 2.24 2.66 
(1.00) (0.90) 
SA take-up rate (%) 11.03 13.05 
(8.44) (7.53) 
ln (per capita municipal spending) 10.37 10.36 
(0.17) (0.14) 
Municipal tax rate (%) 16.28 16.51 
(1.72) (1.76) 
Fraction in resident-owned home (%) 76.95 76.95 
(13.56) (13.56) 
# municipalities 279 279 
Notes: The variables are described in the appendix. “Municipal unemployment” and “SA 
take-up rate” are not available for 1981 and 1982; values from 1983 are used. “Fraction in 
resident-owned home” is based on the 1985 census; the same value is used for all years. The 
variables are weighted according to the sample size of each year within the 81/83 and the 
87/89 cohorts respectively. 
 
 
3.3  When does the placement policy solve methodological 
problems? 
Most previous studies deal with immigrants’ first choice of location in the host 
country. If we ignore (or include controls for) the fact that choosing some re-
gions may cost more than choosing others, estimates from a standard choice 
model will reflect preferences in the group studied. When it comes to studying IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants   12
location decisions in subsequent periods—secondary locations—there are 
methodological problems that may bias the results. This section discusses these 
problems, and under which conditions the placement policy can be used to 
handle them. 
There are basically three alternatives for studying secondary location behav-
ior: (i) find out which regions people tend to leave; (ii) investigate how the 
whole population of interest is distributed over regions after some time in the 
host country; (iii) study the destination choices of movers. 
With the first approach, it is easy to see that estimations relying on data 
where people choose also their initial location can suffer from severe bias due 
to unobserved heterogeneity. There are two obvious ways that this problem 
could occur. The first one parallels the ability bias much studied in the school-
ing literature. Suppose people with high “innate” migration propensity initially 
tend to go to localities with, say, large populations. The result is that the esti-
mate on population size will be positively biased. 
The bias can also be a result of sorting. If the impact of a certain regional 
characteristic differs between individuals, and people act on these differences 
in initial location choices, we will normally be unable to estimate the average 
effect of this variable on the relocation probability.
12 If this is an important is-
sue or not, can be examined with the data available in this study. The natural 
experiment character of the placement of the 87/89 cohorts yields data that are 
free from the type of correlation discussed here,
13 whereas it is a potential prob-
lem for the 81/83 cohorts.
14 
Other problems plague approaches (ii) and (iii) above. Here, the existence 
of relocation costs plays a central role. Without these costs, everybody will al-
ways be in optimum, and we should use alternative (ii) to get a correct picture 
                                                      
12 See Card (1999) for a discussion of this type of problem in the schooling context. 
13 This topic is further discussed in Edin et al. (2000). Some people may have been more likely 
than others to affect their first location. This was the case for highly educated individuals, who 
were attractive to the municipalities, and for non-singles for whom it was easier to find housing. 
None of the investigations in the study indicate that this is a big problem for the interpretation of 
the placement policy as a natural experiment. 
14 In a maximum likelihood model with a discrete dependent variable, omitting a relevant vari-
able (e.g. “innate mobility”) may bias the estimates even if there is no correlation between the 
omitted variable and the included ones. Yatchew and Griliches (1985) find that in the binary pro-
bit model, the bias leads only to a rescaling of the estimate if there is no correlation; with correla-
tion, it can switch the sign of the parameter estimate. Lee (1982) derives conditions under which 
the multinomial logit model gives unbiased estimates even if there is an omitted variable. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants  13
of the group’s preferences. If there are relocation costs, neither the whole group 
nor the movers may give appropriate results. Those who stay may not have re-
alized their preferred option, because the gains associated with doing so are 
lower than the costs of moving. The problem with movers is that their prefer-
ences may not be representative of the whole group. Assume, e.g., that the 
preference for living in large cities is correlated with the ability to make the 
right choice immediately. Studying choices only among those who relocate will 
then underestimate the average preference for large cities. Under certain condi-
tions, using movers in cohorts arriving under the government placement policy 
solves this problem. 
I will now use a little more structure to discuss when the placement policy 
can be useful for studying relocation decisions and destination choices of mov-
ers. Assume for simplicity that there are two regions— 1 r and  2 r —and that  1 r  
contains a factor m  that  2 r  does not. We also assume that the preferences for 
m in the population of interest are such that a fraction α prefers  1 r  and thereby 
) 1 ( α  prefers  2 r . The odds ratio  ) 1 /( α α  therefore reflects preferences for 
1 r  relative to  2 r . Assume also that the government puts a fraction β , 
1 < < 0 β , of the population in  1 r  and  ) 1 ( β  in  2 r , without concern for indi-
vidual preferences or characteristics. 
Consider the decision to relocate. In the absence of relocation costs, we will 
observe that α  of those located in  2 r  will leave for  1 r , and that  ) 1 ( α  of 
those originally in  2 r  will move in the opposite direction. The odds ratio for 
leaving  2 r  compared to leaving  1 r  will therefore be  ) 1 /( α α ; thus, it captures 
preferences in a correct way. Note that  β  is irrelevant to this result—it does 
not matter how the government disperses people. 
Introducing relocation costs puts restrictions on the analysis. The basic re-
quirement is that the fraction of potential movers that refrain from relocating 
because of the cost should be the same in both regions. The odds ratio is then 
unaffected by the presence of a cost for relocating. Several factors could violate 
this requirement. Suppose that the choice of preferred region is based on an un-
derlying continuous utility function of the factor m, and that the relocation cost 
is constant across regions and individuals. The locked-in fraction will then 
normally differ across regions unless the utility function is symmetric with IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants   14
mean zero; i.e., equal fractions prefer  1 r  and  2 r .
15 Studying relocations will 
normally also be misleading if the relocation cost is not constant, and is corre-
lated with living in or having preferences for a particular region. 
For the moment, assume that the process generating relocations does meet 
these requirements, so that the fractions moving out of  2 r  and  1 r  are α  and 
) 1 ( α  respectively.
16 The study of destination choices among movers is then 
complicated if the government to a larger extent puts people in regions of a cer-
tain type, i.e., if  5 . 0  β  in our example. The problem occurs because the dis-
tribution of destination choices depends on the number of moves to different 
regions, and not on the fraction of those located in one region that chooses to 
leave for another region. 
The fraction of all immigrants relocating from  2 r  to  1 r  is  ) 1 ( β α , and the 
fraction moving in the opposite direction is  β α ) 1 ( . The fraction of all relo-
cations going to  1 r  is then 
 
) 1 ( + ) 1 (
) 1 (
β α β α
β α
 (1) 
If the destination choices correctly reflect preferences, this fraction should 
be equal to α . It is easy to verify that this is only true when  5 . 0 = ) 1 ( = β β  
(unless    α equals zero or one). However, we can use the initial placement pat-
tern to see which way the bias goes. Whenever  5 . 0 > β , we will underestimate 
the fraction that prefers  1 r —the expression above will be smaller than α . 
Thus, if people were more often located in regions with a high value of the fac-
tor m, we will have a negative bias in the estimate of how m affects location 
choices. 
Which implications do we get for the empirical analysis? The government 
placement helps by eliminating bias due to unobserved characteristics of the 
individuals. The analysis of relocation decisions then requires that, conditional 
on observed individual characteristics and all other regional variables, refrain-
ing from moving because of relocation costs is not correlated with living in or 
having preferences for one type of region. 
                                                       
15 Assume that people get utility  i γ  from m, and that the relocation cost is c. The formal restric-
tion is then  ) 0 < | < ( = ) 0 > | > ( i i i i c P c P γ γ γ γ . 
16 Obviously, it does not matter if the fractions instead are  α k  and  ) 1 ( α − k , where k is the frac-
tion of potential movers who move also in the presence of a relocation cost. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants  15
Investigating subsequent location choices of movers initially placed by the 
government requires the same assumptions about relocation costs. To find out 
whether there is bias because the government aimed the placement at certain 
regions, I will estimate choice models for the initial location. A positive esti-
mate on, e.g., local unemployment, can be interpreted as  5 . 0 > β  for this fac-
tor; we then know that the parameter estimate for unemployment is negatively 
biased in the model for secondary location choice. I will return to this issue in 
the presentation of the results. 
An alternative approach is to assume that relocation costs are small com-
pared to the potential gains from relocating, and do not lock in prospective 
movers to any substantial extent. Under this assumption everybody should al-
ways be in optimum, and we could just look at the residential pattern of an im-
migrant cohort at different points in time, regardless of regime at arrival.  
The initial locations of 81/83 immigrants will be used to study primary deci-
sions of refugee immigrants. For secondary locations, my strategy is to both 
use measures that allow for relocation costs of a specific character, and meas-
ures that assume these costs to be negligible. Decisions to leave the initial loca-
tion and destination choices of movers among program participants can then be 
compared with residential patterns among program participants and cohorts ar-
riving prior to the policy change. If these different measures give consistent 
pictures of how regional factors affect location decisions, or differ in a way that 
can be explained through the methodological problems discussed here, it seems 
plausible that the estimates reflect preferences. 
 
3.4  The decision to relocate 
I now turn to the empirical investigation of how different factors affect the de-
cision to relocate out of the initial place of residence. Table 3 below shows 
logit estimates for program participants’ and previous immigrants’ probability 
to relocate within four years after immigration.
17 I will first present the results 
                                                       
17 Moulton (1990) shows how using aggregate explanatory variables on micro units in a linear 
regression may result in serious downward bias in the estimated standard errors of the regression 
coefficients. Stata, the software used, allows for relaxing the assumption of non-correlation of the 
disturbances within defined units. In our case, this means letting the data be clustered by munici-
pality. This procedure does not change the parameter estimates, only their variance. It turns out 
that controlling for possible clustering changes the standard errors dramatically, decreasing the 
number of significant relations. To avoid excessive interpretations I report the clustered standard 
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that utilize the placement policy, and then compare these with the potentially 
biased results for previous immigrants. The first column contains the results for 
a basic model for 87/89 immigrants; in the second column we find results from 
a model where an additional set of variables has been included. I start by pre-
senting the basic model, and then proceed to the extended one. 
 
Table 3. Relocation out of the initial municipality. 
  87/89 immigrants  81/83 immigrants
 Basic Extended Basic Extended 
Ethnic concentration
  –.034** –.040** –.014 –.031** 
 (.010) (.009) (.012) (.009) 
Immigrant density
  –.021 .014 –.005 .036 
 (.021) (.023) (.021) (.030) 
ln (mun population)  –.716** –.645** –.667** –.721** 
 (.134) (.101) (.121) (.127) 
Municipal unemployment  .162 .228* –.054 .037 
 (.083) (.098) (.088) (.120) 
ln (mean earnings)  1.241* .747 
 (.551) (1.145) 
Immigrant employment  –.077** –.141** 
 (.011) (.035) 
SA takers  –.091 –.163** 
 (.076) (.121) 
SA take-up rate  –.111 .140 
 (.486) (.493) 
ln (per capita mun spend)  –.040 –.071** 
 (.032) (.031) 
Municipal tax rate  –.001 .013 
 (.006) (.019) 
Fraction in resident-owned  –.002 –.010 
 (.005) (.007) 
Continued on the next page. 
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Table 3 continued. 
Female –.355** –.340** –.805** –.748** 
 (.081) (.082) (.214) (.220) 
Age –.005 –.008 .093* .065 
 (.019) (.019) (.046) (.045) 
Age squared *10
–2 –.025 –.025 –.165* –.128 
 (.027) (.028) (.072) (.071) 
Married –.291** –.252** –.536** –.464** 
 (.064) (.064) (.157) (.152) 
Married*female .068 .039 .375 .312 
 (.100) (.101) (.235) (.235) 
Region of origin (E Eur ref.)   
Africa .404* .304 .526** .439* 
 (.160) (.164) (.178) (.184) 
Middle East  .554** .471** .311 .255 
 (.134) (.133) (.191) (.168) 
Asia –.265* –.302* .349 .201 
 (.123) (.120) (.224) (.182) 
South America  –.386** –.411** .324 .290 
 (.109) (.103) (.211) (.184) 
# individuals  10,456 10,456 2,718 2,718 
Pseudo R-squared  .18 .19 .13 .15 
Notes: Parameter estimates from logit specifications, robust standard errors (clustered by mu-
nicipality) in parentheses. The dependent variable equals one if the individual does not live in 
the initial municipality four years after immigration. Municipal variables described in the ap-
pendix. Note that the estimates in the 81/83 group suffer from endogeneity bias; the results 
for the 87/89 group are more correct. The 81/83 cohorts are weighted to conform to the re-
gion-of-origin distribution of the 87/89 cohorts. * (**) denotes significance at the 5 (1)-
percent level. Pseudo R-squared = 1–L1/L0, where L1 is the log-likelihood of the presented 
model and L0 is the log-likelihood of a model with only a constant included. 
 
Starting with individual characteristics in the first column of Table 3, we 
find that females are about 20 percent less likely than males to move. Being 
married decreases the relocation probability, but there is no interaction effect 
between gender and marital status. Both the linear and the quadratic term in the 
standard age profile are insignificant, but suggest that the migration probability 
decreases somewhat as age increases. Excluding the quadratic term yields a 
significant estimate for the linear variable, with approximately 5 percentage 
points lower probability for every 10 years (in both specifications). 
The estimations suggest that region of origin is an important determinant of 
migration propensities. People from Africa and the Middle East are most mo-
bile, whereas those from Asia and South America appear to be less likely to 
move. The effects are quite sizable: the parameters e.g. suggest that Africans IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants   18
have 30 percent higher migration probability than Eastern Europeans, and that 
immigrants from the Middle East are almost twice as likely to move compared 
to South Americans. 
The basic setup contains the three variables related to municipal population 
composition discussed in 3.2. The first population variable is the fraction of the 
municipal population made up by people from the individual’s own ethnic 
group, defined by country of birth.
18 As expected, the larger this fraction, the 
lower the probability to leave. The estimates point at a 10 percent decrease in 
the probability following a standard deviation
19 increase in the variable. This 
finding matches the American research in this field; see e.g. Bartel (1989). The 
second population variable—the overall share of immigrants in the municipal-
ity—gives results that are insignificant in the clustered specifications. 
Third, the log of municipal population is included. We find that the effect is 
negative, highly significant, and of sizable magnitude: the probability of leav-
ing a municipality with 60,000 residents is about 15 percentage points lower 
than leaving one with 22,000 people. Some of this is just a mechanical conse-
quence of the employed definition of relocation; also when randomly changing 
place of residence, the chance that this will involve crossing a municipality 
border is higher if you start in a small locality.  
For examining whether immigrants consider labor market opportunities 
when making their location decisions, I follow the standard approach of includ-
ing local unemployment in the model (see e.g. Bartel 1989; Zavodny 1997, 
1999; Jaeger 2000). The results suggest that high unemployment may be asso-
ciated with an increased probability of leaving the municipality. The parameter 
estimate implies a probability rise of about 9 percent for a standard deviation 
increase in unemployment. 
All findings for municipal variables are in line with expectations, and are 
robust to specification variations. These include models with dummies for 
counties or county-blocks
20. The inclusion of education (measured eight years 
after arrival) among the regressors does not change the results in any substan-
tial way. In accordance with previous studies, I find that mobility increases 
                                                       
18 People in our sample are identified on the basis of country of birth. Population data from Sta-
tistics Sweden give the number of foreign citizens by nationality (see description in appendix). 
19 This refers to a standard deviation in the variable in the sample of individuals; i.e., the variable 
is population weighted. Cf. the municipality weighted figures of Table 2.  
20 This geographic grouping divides Sweden’s 24 counties (using the pre-1997 definition) into 
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with education.
21 To check the possibility that the specification is not flexible 
enough for the population variables, I have experimented with squares of the 
variables and entering the size of the ethnic group and immigrant population di-
rectly rather than as a fraction of the total population. The alternatives for 
specifying the model confirm the qualitative aspects of the results from the 
original model. 
It is conceivable that the effects of local characteristics vary between 
groups. I have therefore tested specifications where the parameters are allowed 
to vary by region of origin and level of education respectively (estimates not 
shown). There is a slight suggestion that the presence of people from one’s own 
country is more important for people in the lower education categories. This is 
consistent with Bartel’s (1989) finding that people with higher education are 
more geographically dispersed. The results also suggest that the influence of 
local characteristics may vary by region of origin, but there is no clear-cut pat-
tern in the findings. The estimated effect of people from one’s own birth coun-
try is largest for Asians, whereas people from the Middle East and South 
Americans appear to be the most sensitive to local unemployment. 
I now proceed to the results for the extended model of column two in Ta-
ble 3. The first addition is to include a richer parameterization of local labor 
market properties. According to the estimate, high average earnings among 
workers in the municipality increase the probability to leave. This is counterin-
tuitive, but we should keep in mind that this effect is conditional on other labor 
market variables. One possible explanation is that the estimate captures a so-
cioeconomic sorting effect, i.e., refugee immigrants tend to choose less wealthy 
areas. The other added labor market characteristic gives an expected result: 
high employment among immigrants in the municipality decreases the prob-
ability to leave. 
Some researchers, e.g. Borjas (1999b) and Dodson (2001), claim that immi-
grants respond to the generosity of the local welfare system in their location 
decisions. Another literature examines how local public services affect com-
munity choice (Quigley 1985, Nechyba and Strauss 1998, Dahlberg and 
Fredriksson 2001). To examine these points in the context of immigrants to 
                                                       
21 An important caveat, and one reason for excluding education from the basic model, is that the 
causality may be reversed here. People may move in order to study and then fall in a highly edu-
cated category. Since education is measured after arrival, this may be the correlation we observe. 
However, the pattern remains if the sample is restricted to people over 25 years of age at arrival, 
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Sweden, I have included an additional set of municipality variables. Consider 
first per capita municipal spending and the municipal tax rate. Refugee immi-
grants on average have earnings below the mean, and would therefore benefit 
from living in a municipality with a large public sector. We expect a negative 
sign on the estimate for municipal spending, and conditional on spending, a 
positive effect of the tax rate. As shown, neither of the variables yields a sig-
nificant estimate. 
The prevalence of social assistance receipt is a measure of the socioeco-
nomic status of the municipality.
22 Immigrants in our sample have a poor posi-
tion on the labor market. Whether they are drawn to or deterred from places 
with low economic status because of this is hard to decide. On the one hand, it 
may be easier to live among people with similar economic status, but on the 
other, improving one’s economic position may be easier in a wealthier sur-
rounding. The parameter estimate is insignificant. 
Conditions for reception of social assistance are a result of actual implemen-
tation of regulations. Ideally, we would want a measure of how each municipal-
ity treats applicants in different income categories. In the absence of such a 
measure, I use the take-up rate for social assistance, measured as the fraction of 
single-person households with earnings below one base amount receiving so-
cial assistance. The point estimate is insignificant. I have also used the munici-
pal social assistance norm (estimation not in table), which is the annual amount 
that a person is entitled to for costs of food and other household expenses (ex-
cluding housing). The municipalities determine this amount individually.
23 The 
results obtained here do not indicate that people are more likely to remain 
where the take-up rate is high or the norm is generous. 
The last added variable reflects properties of the local housing market. 
There is no evidence here that the share of rentals/resident-owned homes in the 
municipality matters for the relocation decision. Finally, note that the results 
for the population variables are robust to the addition of these variables. Also, 
the inclusion of them makes the positive effect from unemployment on the re-
location probability stronger. 
                                                       
22 As mentioned above, it can also be seen as a crude indicator on welfare generosity. I will re-
turn to this in the analysis of location choices. 
23 In short, the problems with these variables are as follows. The fraction of eligible people that 
applies for social assistance may vary between municipalities; take-up rates could therefore re-
flect properties of the population rather than strictness of regulations. The information value of 
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The results of this section show that the probability of relocating varies with 
individual characteristics. Region of origin seems particularly important, with 
some groups being twice as mobile as others. The municipal characteristics that 
have the statistically most robust influence in triggering relocation are the pres-
ence of people from the individual’s birth country and the size of the popula-
tion. Recent immigrants tend to leave small municipalities, and ones where 
there are few fellow countrymen. Bad labor markets prospects also make out-
migration more likely. 
 
Differences in the estimates between the 81/83 and 87/89 cohorts  
We now go on to compare the estimates for the 87/89 and the 81/83 immigrant 
cohorts. The comparison between the two immigrant groups hinges on the as-
sumption that had the government also placed the 81/83 cohorts the estimates 
would have been the same.
24 It is clear from Table 3 that the point estimates for 
the municipal variables vary substantially between the two regimes.
25 For the 
81/83 group, the only population variable with a parameter of any significance 
in the basic specification (column three) is the log of population; neither the 
fraction one’s own birth country, nor the overall immigrant density seem to 
matter.
26 The sign of the estimates for municipal unemployment is the opposite, 
indicating an insignificant negative correlation between the level of unem-
ployment and relocation. With the richer parameterization of the extended 
model (column four), the estimate on ethnic concentration becomes negative 
and significant, but unemployment does not show any significant effect. 
The conclusion is that using data from a regime where individuals choose 
the initial place of residence to study factors triggering secondary migration 
may be misleading regarding the importance of municipal variables. This could 
be one reason for the insignificance of local characteristics found in some em-
pirical studies (e.g. Widerstedt, 1998). 
 
                                                       
24 Note that the estimates for some individual characteristics differ substantially. A potential ex-
planation is that certain variables are correlated with the ability to make an optimal choice ini-
tially (or having preferences that are stable over time), which would make the estimates for the 
81/83 cohorts misleading. 
25 Pooling the two immigrant groups and estimating the basic model with all variables interacted 
by cohort, shows that the difference in the estimates is statistically strongest for unemployment 
(P = .01). 
26 The lower significance could be a result of the much smaller number of observations, but the 
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3.5  The choice of destination 
In the preceding section we found that some municipal characteristics influ-
enced the decision to leave the initial place of residence. With the same reason-
ing, these factors should also have an effect on the initial and secondary desti-
nation choices.
27 In this section I primarily use 81/83 immigrants to study what 
influences initial choices, and 87/89 program participants to investigate secon-
dary choices.  
To analyze location choices, I estimate specifications of McFadden’s choice 
model. Which geographic level that is most appropriate is something of an 
open question. A very low level, e.g. neighborhoods, could be what people ac-
tually choose, but leads to computational problems. Also, the number of alter-
natives becomes so big that the model is unrealistic from a theoretical point of 
view. Large regions will have problems with within-region variation in the ex-
amined variables. Primarily, I use municipalities as the geographic unit, but I 
will use county and labor market region estimations to check the robustness of 
the results. 












where  ij P  is the probability that individual i chooses region  J j ,..., 1 = .  j Z  is a 
vector of regional characteristics, and since  γ  is common to all regions, all in-
dividual characteristics cancel out of the expression. Differences in choice be-
havior with respect to individual variables are therefore investigated by estima-
tions on subsamples. 
Table 4 shows results from conditional logit estimations of destination 
choices. The variables are measured at time t – the year of immigration. To in-
terpret the results, note that  
                                                      
27 It is intuitively appealing to think that local factors triggering relocations should have an oppo-
site effect on the probability to choose a new place of residence. However, there is a caveat to 
this idea. Assume that there are two types of regions, one with high x and one with low. Suppose 
that most immigrants choose (or are assigned to) a high x, so that x affects the choice probability. 
If there is little variation in x in the regions chosen, x may not be related to the probability of re-
locating, even though it affects destination choices. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants  23









   (3) 
If we are interested in the relative change in  ij P  implied by a one-unit 
change in  j Z , we need to multiply the coefficients by  ) 1 ( ij P . Needless to 
say, this correction becomes more important the larger  ij P  (cf. the binary 
model above). It does not make much difference when we are looking at aver-
age effects, since the average probability is about 0.004; in principle we can in-
terpret the estimates as percent changes in the probability following a one-unit 
change in the explanatory variable.
28 
The structure of Table 4 below is as follows. The first column shows esti-
mates for initial location choices of the 81/83 cohorts, who were not affected 
by the placement policy. The second column shows estimates for the secondary 
choices of the 87/89 cohorts—program participants. The third column displays 
the signs of the biases of the estimates in the second column. I retrieved the 
signs of the biases by estimating a model for initial location of the 87/89 co-
horts (the estimates are displayed in Table A2). As discussed in section 3.3, a 
positive (negative) estimate in the model for initial placement yields a negative 
(positive) bias in the model for secondary locations. 
                                                      
28 In the sample of 81/83 immigrants, 21 percent initially chose the municipality of Stockholm, 8 
Göteborg, and 7 Malmö. Among movers in the 87/89 cohorts, the corresponding figures were 14, 
13, and 7 four years after immigration. Throughout, I discuss average effects. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants   24
 
Table 4. Choice of municipality at immigration and in subsequent periods. 
 Initial,  81/83  cohorts
T+4, movers
in 87/89 cohorts Bias
Ethnic concentration
  .084** .078** –
 (.004) (.004)
Immigrant density
  .038** .061** –
 (.007) (.006)
ln (municipal population)  1.104** 1.104** +
1
 (.031) (.027)
Municipal unemployment  –.217** –.113** +
 (.026) (.034)
ln (mean earnings)  3.151** .819* –
 (.423) (.322)
Immigrant employment  –.106** .018** +
 (.008) (.006)
SA takers  .355** .134** –
 (.031) (.028)
SA take-up rate  .002 .003 0
 (.003) (.003)
Municipal tax rate  .000 .024** 0 (+)
 (.008) (.006)
ln (per capita mun spending)  –.015 –.017 –
 (.216) (.193)
Fraction in resident-owned 
home .004 –.003 +
 (.002) (.002)
# individuals  2,810 3,928
Pseudo R-squared  .36 .27
Notes: Estimates from conditional logit models, 279 alternatives for each individual. Regional 
variables described in the appendix. “Bias” gives the sign of the bias in the estimates for the 
87/89 cohorts. This is based on the initial location pattern of this cohort, presented in Table 
A2. A positive (negative) estimate in the model for initial locations yields a negative (posi-
tive) bias in the model for secondary locations. The 81/83 cohorts are weighted to conform to 
the region-of-origin distribution of the 87/89 cohorts.  
1 If placement/choice is random with respect to population size, the estimate on the log of 
population should be one. Since it is less than one for the initial location of the 87/89 cohorts 
(Table A2), the placement policy was targeted at small municipalities. People with prefer-
ences for large cities were then more likely to relocate. * (**) denotes significance at the 5 
(1)-percent level. Pseudo R-squared = 1–L1/L0, where L1 is the log-likelihood of the pre-
sented model and L0 is the log-likelihood of a model with only a constant included. 
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Consider first the estimates for initial choices in the 81/83 cohorts. Just as 
we would expect, a large fraction of people from the individual’s birth country 
increases the probability of choosing a particular region. The estimates imply 
that if ethnic concentration rises by 0.1 percentage points, the probability in-
creases by about eight percent. Consistent with previous research, large overall 
immigrant populations are also attractive: if immigrant representation increases 
by one percent, the choice probability goes up by almost four percent. If immi-
grants chose to distribute themselves in accordance with the rest of the popula-
tion, the estimate for the log of population would be one. Here, the point esti-
mate suggests that a one-percent increase in the size of the municipal popula-
tion raises the probability with more than one percent, which would indicate 
that people are attracted to large municipalities.  
High unemployment decreases the probability of choosing a municipality: 
the choice probability falls more than 20 percent for each percentage point. 
Conditional on other characteristics, immigrants also choose high-earning mu-
nicipalities initially, which is at odds with the results in Table 3. Surprisingly, 
the immigrant employment variable yields a significantly negative estimate; it 
is hard to find an intuition for this result. 
I also find that other variables that were not related to the relocation deci-
sion affect the choice of destination. Immigrants in our sample choose munici-
palities where there are many social assistance recipients. If the ratio of social 
assistance households to the overall population increases by one percentage 
point (about a standard deviation in the variable), we get a more than 30 per-
cent higher choice probability. The fact that the variable seems to affect loca-
tion choice but not decisions to relocate could indicate that immigrants face re-
strictions in their choice sets. As discussed above, this effect may also reflect a 
preference for living among others in the same economic circumstances, or be 
a sign on welfare seeking. Note, though, that the estimate on the social assis-
tance take-up rate is insignificant. 
Properties of local housing markets may be of greater importance for the 
destination choice than for the relocation decision, since everybody has a place 
to stay before they relocate. However, the fraction of people living in dwellings 
owned by themselves does not have any effect on the initial choice of location. 
The estimates for municipal spending and the local tax rate are both insignifi-
cant. Thus, initial choices do not seem to be guided by consideration of local 
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Let us now turn to the destination choices among movers in the 87/89 co-
horts; the second column of Table 4 gives the results. Remember from section 
3.3 that under certain assumptions about relocation costs, this group’s choices 
can be used to investigate preferences. We should also bear in mind the bias 
that occurs if the initial placement was targeted at some types of regions 
The most interesting question is if there are differences between initial and 
subsequent choices. Ethnic concentration appears to be equally important in 
later stages; the estimate is slightly smaller but has a negative bias. Overall 
immigrant density even has a larger effect for the secondary choice, especially 
considering the negative bias. This result is interesting, since it suggests that 
the immigrant population will become more geographically concentrated over 
time. It also goes against the view that individuals tend to opt for less immi-
grant dense regions after some time in the host country. The estimate on popu-
lation size is larger than one, but since the placement was targeted at small mu-
nicipalities, it may not be safe to conclude that big cities attract movers. 
Considering the sign of the biases, it seems that unemployment and mean 
earnings play similar roles in the initial and later stages. Immigrant employ-
ment yields a positive estimate, but its bias is also positive. It is not clear 
whether and how this factor affects decisions in any stage. 
In general, knowledge on differences in local welfare systems and public 
services should improve with time in the host country. I find that locations with 
many welfare recipients are popular also among movers, and that there is no ef-
fect of the take-up rate. The positive estimate on the tax rate is interesting but 
somewhat surprising. One interpretation is that both this variable and the mu-
nicipal spending capture the same phenomenon: a large local public sector.
29 
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that spending yields a significant esti-
mate if the tax rate is excluded (and so does the tax rate if spending is left out). 
There are at least two reasons why this sample of immigrants might prefer sub-
stantial public sectors. First, as already mentioned, they are in the lower part of 
the income distribution, and would therefore benefit from local redistribution 
via taxes. Second, they may value certain public services that are more likely to 
be available in locations with large public sectors, such as training in the home 
language for children. 
                                                      
29 Indeed, if the local tax base was identical across municipalities, and if the government had to 
spend exactly the taxes raised in each period, the tax rate and the per capita public spending 
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The findings of this section indicate that the regional factors with the 
strongest impact on the initial location choice also guide secondary choices. 
Proximity to people from one’s own birth country and overall immigrant den-
sity are important, as are general labor market properties. The most robust dif-
ference between initial and secondary choices is that the importance of other 
immigrants appears to increase with time in Sweden. There are also indications 
that local public services are more important in later stages than initially, which 
could be explained by imperfect information at the time of immigration. 
 
3.6  Variations on location choice 
This section performs a sensitivity analysis for the findings of section 3.5 and 
investigates whether location choices differ between different immigrant 
groups and natives. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
To check the robustness of the results, I first use the residential pattern in the 
whole group rather than looking at movers only, and also check whether using 
location at a later point in time matters for the results. Second, I discuss some 
further variations on the above specifications. Third, I check if the results 
change when the unit of choice is labor market regions or counties instead of 
municipalities. 
As discussed in section 3.3, it is not clear whether one should use destina-
tion choices of movers or the residential pattern of the whole sample in the 
analysis. Table A2 shows estimations for the initial location, and locations for 
movers and the whole sample four and eight years after arrival in the 81/83 and 
87/89 cohorts. The qualitative aspects of the results for the population vari-
ables, local unemployment, and average earnings appear to hold across cohorts, 
groups and time periods. 
The tendency to choose locations with substantial shares of welfare recipi-
ents also holds in all specifications. However, there is a discrepancy between 
the cohorts in the effect of the SA take-up rate: among 81/83 immigrants it has 
a significantly positive effect in secondary periods, whereas the estimate is 
close to zero in the 87/89 cohorts. The results presented in the table also 
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choice probabilities. There is also an indication that movers go to locations 
with substantial fractions of rentals in the housing market.
30 
Let me now turn to some variations on the specifications of Table 4. A first 
possibility is that people are more likely to move to locations close to the origi-
nal one. This could either be a result of better information about closer alterna-
tives, or a higher relocation cost for long-distance moves. I have checked this 
by including a measure of the distance between the initial municipality of resi-
dence and the choice alternative. I have also included a dummy variable for all 
alternatives that are located in the same county as the initial municipality. Fur-
thermore, people may have regional preferences that are not based on any of 
the included variables. I have therefore also added county-block dummies to 
the models for initial location choice and movers’ destinations. Even though 
these variables enter significantly, indicating that people are less likely to move 
long distances and much more likely to choose an alternative within their origi-
nal county, most results hold under these variations.
31 It should be pointed out, 
however, that the estimated effect of the tax rate becomes negative if county-
block dummies are included. One should therefore be cautious in the interpreta-
tion of the results for this variable. 
We now continue to the examination of alternative geographic units. Swe-
den consists of 24 counties, and is also divided into 111 labor market regions.
 32 
I have estimated choice equations where population variables and labor market 
characteristics based on these regions are included. Most results hold, but the 
effect of average earnings becomes negative in some specifications. 
 
Do location choices differ between groups? 
It is likely that certain factors affect some groups more than others. I have 
therefore estimated the model of Table 4 on samples divided by gender, educa-
tion level, and region of origin respectively (the estimates are not shown). In-
terestingly, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, I find that female movers are 
more affected by local unemployment when choosing their destination. The es-
                                                      
30 Raw means of the variable show the same thing. The average native in our sample lived in a 
municipality with 68 percent resident-owned homes in 1985. Among movers in the 87/89 refugee 
cohorts the figure was 59 percent, whereas the average value for native movers was 69 percent. 
31 The average earnings variable looses its significance (z-value around 1.6) when the distance 
variable and the “same county” variable are added. 
32 Using the pre-1997 definition of counties and 1992 classification of labor market regions. IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants  29
timates on the fraction in resident-owned homes signal that men drive the in-
creased probability of going to places with high shares of rentals. 
The criterion for falling in the high-educated group is that the individual has 
at least some post-high school education (more than 12 years of schooling) 
eight years after immigration. Bartel (1989) finds that more educated immi-
grants in the US are less concentrated to certain regions, and less dependent on 
ethnic ties in their location decisions. This is not confirmed in these estimations 
(in contrast to the results for the relocation decision). The estimates on the eth-
nic group variable are actually larger for the highly educated. I also find that 
unemployment affects those with less education more, whereas the highly edu-
cated are more likely to choose places with high average earnings, which is an 
expected result. There are no indications that people with little education are 
drawn to large public sectors or generous welfare systems to a larger extent 
than the highly educated. 
When the samples are split according to region of origin, it seems that the 
population variables have qualitatively similar impacts, but that there are dif-
ferences in the magnitudes of the effects. Asians appear to be unaffected by la-
bor market characteristics,
33 and people from Africa and the Middle East drive 
the positive effect of high tax rates. Opposite to other groups, Eastern Europe-
ans are more likely to choose municipalities with many resident-owned homes. 
The next issue is whether location choice differs between refugees, OECD 
migrants and natives? Table 5 shows estimations of the extended specification 
for the two latter groups. The table shows estimates for (i) location choices 
among native movers sampled in 87/89, (ii) the initial location of the 81/83 co-
horts of OECD migrants, and (iii) location choices among movers in the 87/89 
cohorts of OECD migrants; the results are thereby comparable with the ones 
presented in Table 4. Note, though, that we do not have the benefit of the natu-
ral experiment in the analysis of these movers. 
It seems that OECD migrants are drawn to places where there are people 
from their own country, but not necessarily a large overall immigrant popula-
tion. Contrary to refugee immigrants, none of these groups appear to be at-
tracted to large municipalities per se. The results for labor market variables 
among OECD migrants are similar to the ones for refugee immigrants. For na-
                                                      
33 The estimate on the unemployment variable is close to zero for individuals from the Middle 
East, which contrasts to the finding for the relocation decision, where this group was among the 
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tives, the estimates suggest that earnings levels have a strong impact on mov-
ers, but local unemployment shows no effect. 
OECD migrants are similar to refugee immigrants in the sense that both 
groups move to places with a high share of rentals, although the effect is statis-
tically stronger for OECD migrants. Neither of the local public sector variables 
(tax rate and spending) enters significantly in Table 5. This is consistent with 
the above-mentioned explanation that refugee immigrants may have more to 
gain from public spending than others, given their overall weaker earnings po-
sition. Frequent welfare receipt attracts also OECD migrants, but the SA take-
up rate yields a significantly negative estimate both for this group and for na-
tives. 
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Table 5. Natives’ and OECD migrants’ location choices. 
 Natives OECD  migrants 
  87/89, movers 81/83, all 87/89, movers 
Ethnic concentration
  .025** .025** 
 (.001) (.001) 
Immigrant density
  –.022 .012 .010 
 (.015) (.009) (.014) 
ln (municipal population)  .977** 1.019** .884** 
 (.050) (.032) (.045) 
Municipal unemployment  –.002 –.167** –.255** 
 (.051) (.022) (.054) 
ln (mean earnings)  2.631** 1.905** 2.141** 
 (.505) (.385) (.477) 
Immigrant employment  .012 –.053** .009 
 (.009) (.008) (.009) 
SA takers  .065 .079* .161** 
 (.055) (.031) (.051) 
SA take-up rate  –.015** .000 –.020** 
 (.005) (.003) (.005) 
Municipal tax rate  –.011 .013 .001 
 (.013) (.008) (.012) 
ln (per capita mun spending)  –.372 .151 –.177 
 (.332) (.209) (.322) 
Fraction in res-owned home  –.005 –.011** –.008** 
 (.003) (.002) (.003) 
# individuals  1,005 2,440 1,166 
Pseudo R-squared  .12 .26 .16 
Notes: Estimates from conditional logit models for choice of municipality, 279 alternatives. 
Regional variables are described in the appendix. * (**) denotes significance at the 5 (1)-
percent level. Pseudo R-squared = 1–L1/L0, where L1 is the log-likelihood of the presented 
model and L0 is the log-likelihood of a model with only a constant included. 
 
 
4 Concluding  remarks 
The empirical investigation performed in this paper has focused on three is-
sues: (i) how do regional factors affect location decisions among immigrants to 
Sweden; (ii) do these effects differ between initial and subsequent periods; (iii) IFAU – Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants   32
do the effects differ across groups. To answer these questions I have utilized a 
unique natural experiment and used longitudinal data where different groups 
and cohorts can be tracked over time. 
Population composition plays an important role in residential decisions 
among the immigrants studied. They leave locations with small populations, 
and are attracted to large municipalities. The presence of people from one’s 
birth country is important for the choice of initial location, the decision to leave 
it, and for choosing a new one. A large overall immigrant population is also at-
tractive in location choices, even more so in secondary decisions. By and large, 
these findings conform to results from the US. 
The results for other municipal characteristics contain some optimistic mes-
sages. Immigrants are affected by labor market prospects. They leave localities 
with high overall unemployment, and move to municipalities with low unem-
ployment rates and high average earnings, given their other characteristics. La-
bor market prospects and population composition appear to have similar effects 
initially and in later stages.  
Furthermore, I find that immigrants choose municipalities where welfare re-
ceipt is prevalent. Whether this reflects restrictions on choice opportunities, so-
cioeconomic sorting (i.e. preferences for living with people in similar circum-
stances), or welfare seeking is hard to tell. There are also indications that refu-
gees learn about the availability of local public services and, unlike economic 
immigrants, base secondary location choices on this factor.  
One conclusion from this paper is that regions that today have large immi-
grant populations can expect high levels of immigration in the future, and also 
a larger immigrant representation in the longer run. It is also probable that the 
future immigrants to a large extent will come from the same countries as the 
present ones. Public decision makers can also expect immigrants to consider 
labor market opportunities in their choices. This can be valuable information 
for the design of future social policies in Sweden and elsewhere. 
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Appendix 
 
A1: Countries excluded 
The following countries that were members of the OECD in 1985 were ex-





Canada The  Netherlands 
Denmark New  Zealand 
Finland Norway 
France Portugal 
Germany (West)  Spain 
Greece Switzerland 
Iceland United  Kingdom 




Turkey was also a member in 1985, but was still included because of the 
large inflow of refugee immigrants from Turkey to Sweden during the observa-
tion period. 
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A2: Data and tables 
 
Description of municipal variables 
  
- Population (Pop)  # people living in the geographic unit. (Source: Statistics 
Sweden.) 
- Ethnic group (Et)  # people with citizenship in the same country as the in-
dividual was born in within the geographic unit. (Statis-
tics Sweden.) 
- Immigrants (Im)  # foreign citizens – Et. (Statistics Sweden.) 
- Unemployment   Mean number of unemployed / population age 16–64. 
(The National Labour Market Board (AMS).) 
- Average earnings  Average annual earnings for earners, age 18–64. 
(LINDA.) 
- Average im earnings  Average annual earnings for the stock of the foreign-
born, age 18–64, including zeros (SEK). (LINDA.) 
- Fraction im earners  Fraction of the foreign-born, 18–64, with above zero 
earnings. (LINDA.) 
- SA takers  # households receiving social assistance (annually) / 
Pop. (Statistics Sweden.)  
- SA take-up rate  Fraction of municipal population with earnings less than 
one base amount receiving SA (of those aged 18–64 in 
single-person households not receiving study allow-
ances). (LINDA.) 
- SA norm  The annual amount that people are entitled to for cover-
age of food and other household expenses (excluding 
housing). Varies by year and municipality. (Statistics 
Sweden, “Statistiska meddelanden”.) 
- Municipal spending  Total municipal spending (1000 SEK) / Pop. (Statistics 
Sweden.) 
- Tax rate  Municipal tax rate (percent). (Statistics Sweden.) 
- Fraction in resident-
owned home 
The fraction of people in the municipality living in a 
house or apartment of which they have some type of 
ownership. (LINDA, 1985 census.) 
- Municipal distances  Geographic distance between the initial municipality and 
the choice alternative (used in destination choice estima-
tions). (Department of Social and Economic Geography, 
Uppsala University.)  
 
Notes: Source is for raw data; most measures are derived from further calculations. 
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Table A1. Sample properties, means, (std dev). 
 Refugees  Natives  OECD  migrants 
Variable 81/83 87/89 81/83 87/89 81/83 87/89 
Female .47 .44 .48 .49 .51 .44 
Age (at immigration)  29.56 30.18 35.30 35.64 29.31 29.97 
Std dev. (age)  (8.46) (8.34) (10.66) (10.63) (8.80) (8.89) 
Married (at immigration)  .55 .60 .51 .45 .37 .34 
Married*female .30 .32 .26 .24 .19 .16 
Region of origin   
  Nordic  .64 .67 
  Western Europe  .29 .24 
  Eastern Europe  .37 .17  
  Africa  .09 .12  
  Middle East  .23 .46  
  Asia  .14 .08 .01 .01 
  North America  .05 .07 
  South America  .16 .16  
  Oceania  .01 .02 
Education   
  <9, missing  .26 .21 .23 .13 .26 .20 
  9–10 years  .11 .19 .13 .12 .12 .19 
  High school ≤ 2 .29 .17 .30 .35 .24 .21 
  High school >2  .13 .18 .10 .13 .13 .14 
  University <3  .10 .13 .12 .14 .11 .12 
  University ≥ 3 .11 .11 .12 .13 .14 .14 
# individuals  2,810 10,674 7,303 7,818 2,440 4,990 
# individuals education  2,694 9,982 7,144 7,660 2,011 3,873 
Notes: All variables except education measured at the time of immigration (sampling for na-
tives).  Education shows fractions in each education category, measured eight years after im-
migration (sample year for natives). The 1981 cohort uses education measured in 1990. 
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Table A2a. Initial and subsequent location choices, 81/83 cohorts. 
 Initial T+4  T+8 
 All Movers All Movers All 
Ethnic concentration.
  .084 .059 .070 .038 .064 
 (.004) (.009) (.004) (.009) (.004) 
Immigrant density
  .038 .020 .018 .027 .021 
 (.007) (.012) (.008) (.011) (.008) 
ln (regional population)  1.104 .924 1.152 .914 1.129 
 (.031) (.047) (.033) (.044) (.032) 
Unemployment –.217 –.154 –.262 –.222 –.281 
 (.026) (.049) (.030) (.045) (.030) 
Ln (mean earnings)  3.151 4.447 2.389 3.529 2.369 
 (.423) (.739) (.471) (.646) (.462) 
Immigrant employment  –.106 –.002 –.027 .001 –.029 
 (.008) (.017) (.011) (.015) (.010) 
SA takers  .355 .189 .341 .154 .326 
 (.031) (.051) (.032) (.048) (.032) 
SA take-up rate  .002 .037 .017 .036 .018 
 (.003) (.006) (.003) (.005) (.003) 
Municipal tax rate  .000 .028 .020 .016 .019 
 (.008) (.014) (.008) (.013) (.008) 
ln (per capita mun spending)  –.015 –.636 .039 –.327 .027 
 (.216) (.376) (.232) (.338) (.230) 
Resident-owned homes  .004 –.022 –.001 –.017 –.001 
 (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) 
# individuals  2,810 934 2,718 1,086 2,694 
Pseudo R-sq  0.36 0.35 0.40 0.32 0.39 
Notes: See Table A2b. 
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Table A2b. Initial and subsequent location choices, 87/89 cohorts. 
 Initial T+4  T+8 
 All Movers All Movers All 
Ethnic concentration.
  .125 .078 .106 .081 .103 
 (.002) (.004) (.002) (.004) (.002) 
Immigrant density
  .019 .061 .034 .065 .040 
 (.004) (.006) (.004) (.006) (.004) 
ln (regional population)  .896 1.104 1.099 1.090 1.112 
 (.015) (.027) (.016) (.024) (.017) 
Unemployment –.099 –.113 –.191 –.126 –.183 
 (.017) (.034) (.022) (.034) (.023) 
Ln (mean earnings)  1.094 .819 .712 2.073 1.403 
 (.179) (.322) (.197) (.300) (.205) 
Immigrant employment  –.057 .018 –.005 .013 –.004 
 (.002) (.006) (.003) (.006) (.004) 
SA takers  .068 .134 .128 .139 .132 
 (.015) (.028) (.017) (.026) (.017) 
SA take-up rate  .002 .003 .003 .000 .002 
 (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) 
Municipal tax rate  –.009 .024 .013 .027 .017 
 (.004) (.006) (.004) (.005) (.004) 
ln (per capita mun spending)  .224 –.017 .159 .109 .207 
 (.105) (.193) (.116) (.185) (.122) 
Resident-owned homes  –.004 –.003 –.002 –.005 –.003 
 (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
# individuals  10,674 3,928 10,456 4,610 9,982 
Pseudo R-sq  .18 .27 .26 .31 .29 
Notes: Estimates from conditional logit models for choice of municipality, 279 alternatives. 
Regional variables described above in the appendix. “Initial” refers to the initial location, 
“T+4” and “T+8” to locations four and eight years later. “Movers” are individuals who live in 
a different municipality four (eight) years after the initial time of observation. The 81/83 co-
horts are weighted to conform to the region-of-origin distribution of the 87/89 cohorts. People 
who emigrate or die exit the database; this is the reason that the number of observations is 
largest in the initial period. 
 
 